How is Boeing just going to get away with this?!?

Airlines had to pay extra for safety upgrades and if they chose not to (it was optional) Boeing didn't tell them about the software glitch that would make the plane crash into the ground.

What the fuck?!?

If it is true that they did not tell the airlines about a known safety concern the answer is they probably aren't going to get away with it. Even if the litigation doesn't sting them, not telling the airlines is a big deal in such a safety conscious industry. Might be a time to invest in Airbus.

This is all going to blow up hugely for Boeing. There's rumblings about paperwork not being in order and various other things.

Yeah, you'd kind of hope that the non-crashy code would be part of the basic spec like elevators and landing gear.

Clubbers, you and Mr D would get on. If I ask one question about anything remotely airliney or about planes I get a whole heap of information (mostly unnecessary but no less impressive). How the hell he stores all that tedious stuff in his brain and for what purpose is beyond me.

Isn't this basically how fire brigades and insurance companies started?  I.e. pay us or your house will burn down.  *nudge nudge*

I’m sure he wouldn’t have written a321 neo twice.  It’s obviously meant to be a320neo and  a321neo 

An example to look at is the Martin Baker  HSE prosecution for the Red Arrows death. MB had known for some time that there was an issue with the ejection seat but failed to warn the RAF.

That is not to say that MB are going out of business as they don't have many competitors and are supplying the seat for the F35.

Boeing don't appear to have known about the issue prior to Lion Air, so wouldn't have realised they needed to forewarn.  

It's not a software glitch as such, the system works as designed. But it's been designed with a reliance on a single point of failure with the AoA sensor, leading to potential activation outside its intended usage.  Design flaw essentially.

There are deeper issues with the certification process, and that'll also shine some light on the regulators too.

Trying to cure an unstable structure with software 

Pilots cannot override the software, even if trained, which most 3rd world are not , once the software puts the aircraft into  a dive in attempting  to adjust for a non existent problem 

Boeing is doomed 

Boeing is not doomed, but they are likely to lose an awkward amount of money. There are still too many customers who will buy from them (including the US Gov) for them to go under.

Probably, and if it was a completely new design there'd have been greater redundancy designed in.  eg I believe the Airbus a/c that are FBW from birth typically have 3 sensor inputs so you have to lose 2 out of three for there to be a problem (although even that doesn't prevent issues, eg AF447 where two incorrect sensors meant the system ignored the only working sensor)

As far as I understand it the design philosophy of the MAX was meant to be that operators would be able to re-train their pilots by powerpoint.   MCAS wasn't meant to create scenarios that pilots wouldn't already be aware of - eg there were already established trim runaway protocols that ought to have caught this in normal circumstances.

The big problem here seems to be MCAS has several design flaws - the lack of sensor input redundancy for one, and another is the assumption that pilots would always offset the full trim applied - such that if activated again the system assumes it is operating from a neutral position rather than from an already nose down position.  In Lion the captain was able to offset the full trim applied by MCAS, when he handed off to his co-pilot to work out what was going on, the co-pilot didn't do the same so MCAS kept pushing the nose further and further down with fatal results.  I think this is what one of the already proposed software fixes was going to address.

From what I've read, the software thing worked on a stall detector dependent on the angle of the wings, which overided the pilots and pushed the nose down.

Not helpful if you're in a normal take-off, wings are set to a high angle and you're a few hundred feet off the ground. And you can't turn the thing off.

Both crashes were for the same reason. Not pilot error, they were experienced.

Not pilot error because the faulty software couldn't be overridden

Open and shut corporate manslaughter charge with exemplary damages and possible jail time