Analysis of the Military Position In Ukraine - 8 August

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 8, 2023, 5:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. Several Russian milbloggers reported on August 8 that Ukrainian forces landed up to seven boats, each carrying around six to seven people, on the east bank of the Dnipro near the settlement of Kozachi Laheri, broke through Russian defensive lines, and advanced up to 800 meters deep.[1] A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian command recently redeployed a “prepared grouping” of Russian airborne (VDV) personnel from the Kozachi Lopan area to Zaporizhia Oblast and replaced them with mobilized fighters from an unspecified unit, thereby weakening Russian defensive power in this area.[2] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo downplayed reports of the Ukrainian landing and claimed that Russian artillery fire repelled the Ukrainian boats and that there are no Ukrainian troops near Kozachi Lopan.[3] However, the majority of prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to utilize tactical surprise and land on the east bank before engaging Russian forces in small arms exchanges, and Saldo was likely purposefully trying to refute claims of Ukrainian presence in this area to avoid creating panic in the already-delicate Russian information space.[4] Hotspots on available NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from the past 24 hours in this area appear to confirm that there was significant combat, likely preceded or accompanied by artillery fire. By the end of the day on August 8, many Russian sources had updated their claims to report that Russian forces retain control over Kozachi Laheri, having pushed Ukrainian forces back to the shoreline, and that small arms skirmishes are occurring in shoreline areas near Kozachi Laheri and other east bank settlements.[5]

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/August_8_FIRMS_Map…

[Source: NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System over Kherson, August 8 and Esri, Maxar, Earthstar Geographics, and the GIS User Community; overlayed on ISW’s August 8 control-of-terrain map]

ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that there are a substantial number of Ukrainian personnel or the deployment of Ukrainian vehicles near Kozachi Laheri, and the current pattern of Russian reporting is more consistent with a limited cross-river raid than a wider Ukrainian operation. Ukrainian officials have not commented on operations in this area as of this writing.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut.[7] The New York Times reported on August 7 that a Ukrainian battalion commander operating in southern Ukraine described counteroffensive operations as a “marathon” and “not a sprint.”[8]

Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war. The Russian and Chinese foreign ministries portrayed the conversation between Lavrov and Wang differently. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Lavrov and Wang “touched on a series of ‘hot’ regional topics including the Ukrainian crisis,” while the Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that the Russian and Chinese sides “exchanged views” about the war.[9] The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s description of the talks may suggest that the Kremlin is becoming dissatisfied with China’s continued efforts to promote its peace plan in international fora, which is consistent with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not interested in a “no-limits partnership” with Russia as the Kremlin desires.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space. Several Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers and another milblogger posted an audio file on August 8 of Prigozhin discussing US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s trip to Niger on August 7.[10] Prigozhin claimed that he is proud of Wagner’s actions in Africa and suggested that the threat of future Wagner involvement in Niger prompted Nuland’s trip.[11] Prigozhin is likely attempting to co-opt Nuland’s trip to Niger to grandstand on one of the few threats he still has the power to execute after realizing that the fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 is making him increasingly irrelevant in the Russian information space.

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank.
  • ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements.
  • Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line, in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 8 and made advances in certain areas.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8 and made advances near Svatove.
  • Russia continues to draw from its stock of Soviet-era equipment to compensate for equipment losses in Ukraine.
  • Russian occupation authorities are preparing for regional elections in occupied areas.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaig…

Ukrainians remaining suspiciously quiet apart from the Kherson raid.  Will be interesting to see if the incursion develops, a strong fient out of the Kherson bridgehead to sow a bit of panic amongst the Russians about being cut off from Crimea would be something one would expect to happen in tandem with serious offensive operations on the Zaporizhia front. 

https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-528-summary/

The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the last 48 hours, as of 5th August 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).

Sloboda Front

includes the area of between Oskil and Aydar river

Slo

  • Russian forces entered Novoselivske and lost a few tanks on the southern outskirts. The settlement is now contested. (source)

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • Vilshana, Synkivka

Siverskyi Donets

overview map of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut and Lysychansk vicinity

Siv

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • Bilohorivka

Bakhmut Front

includes the vicinity of Bakhmut

Bakh

  • Maksym Zhorin, Major of 3rd Assault Brigade, says Ukrainian forces control half of Klishchiivka, and the rest is under their fire control. (source)

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • Kurdyumivka

Avdiivka Front

includes the vicinity of Avdiivka

Avd

  • Ukrainian forces targeted Russian positions with cluster ammunition north of Vodyane, showing that the enemy managed to recapture previously lost positions. (source)

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • Avdiivka

Donetsk Front

includes the center and southern part of Donetsk Oblast

Don

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • Marinka, Staromayorske

Zaporizhzhia Front

includes the Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Zap

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • No activity reported.

Kherson Front

includes the left bank of Dnipro river south of Kherson and Kakhovka

Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:

  • No activity reported.

 

UK Ministry of Defence: https://www.facebook.com/theministryofdefence/

The Ukrainians are going nowhere. That much is clear now. The Russians are too well dug in at this point and still able to source weapons good enough to prevent Ukraine advancing. The Ukrainians can’t risk all of what they do have because they have no guarantees it will be replaced if it is destroyed and they can’t risk being left without the means to prevent Russian counterattacks.   Stalemate looms I fear.  Question then becomes how much appetite does Russia have for a long war (and long term economic hurt from sanctions). That appetite won’t be limitless but it might take years to be a genuine factor if the war (and rate of Russian body bag accumulation) slows. Ukraine faces some tough decisions. 

Think the Russians may hope for a Donald victory- and count on him cutting off the taps for Ukraine. If the war is still going on by next November real risk.

Could Ukraine survive without American support?

CliveWarren09 Aug 23 10:33

Think the Russians may hope for a Donald victory- and count on him cutting off the taps for Ukraine. If the war is still going on by next November real risk.

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it is a risk, but am not sure it happens

a lot of that US aid is being spent in america, it's not cash handed over to Ukrane but cash to big arms companies that have a lot of lobbying power and politcal interests

the other risk is that it pushes europe to more arms independent and the US doesn't want everyone buying french planes and missiles instead of American ones, nor does it really want a europe that can go it alone at the strategic level

Trump is a wild card for sure, but you also see that a lot of support for Russia that was there last year has leeched away, not least because they have been shown to be massively weaker than they presented themselves to be and nobody really wants to back a loser

The Ukrainians are going nowhere. That much is clear now. 

I don't think that is clear at all, the Ukrainians have, it appears to me, not been seriously attempting to go anywhere much.  When they have (around Bakhmut and last week at Robotyne) the seem perfectly capable of advancing despite heavy opposition.  We'll see when they actually do launch their offensive in earnest, surely it must be imminent.  I think you are right about Trump though, Russia must be planning (and no doubt is already executing) all sorts of interference strategies in the election.

Could Ukraine survive without American support?

I think there are a lot of European countries (UK, Germany, Poland, the Baltic and nordic states) which would be willing to significantly ramp up support to make up for a withdrawal of US support, but given the source of much of the key weapon systems and specialst munitions, it would be a heavy blow and would be only sustain them temporarily, 6 months, maybe a year tops.  They would need to make a real push to get the job done while they were still able, and the Russians would be massively motivated to hold on.     

Warren09 Aug 23 11:04

I think you are right about Trump though, Russia must be planning (and no doubt is already executing) all sorts of interference strategies in the election.

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it didnt really do them much good last time though, for all the hype, and the possible intelligence breaches russian sanctions were tightend 

and now they are junior partners with Trump's arch enemies the Chinese and Iranians

The window for major gains must be shrinking as we move into early autumn. Maybe Ukraine is just going to position itself and accept a winter of attrition?

I'd agree that Russian defences are probably too strong as of right now for a breakthrough to be made without excessive cost.  Let's not forget that to reduce the Iraqi defences during the Gulf War the Americans spend 40 days pounding the heck out of them, under conditions of near total air supremacy the like of which may not ever exist again.  

The Ukrainians must be hoping that their efforts to interdict supplies going to the front are successful over the next couple of months, but even if they are, success will not be as quick or (relatively) easy as last year, I fear.  A recent article in RUSI pointed out that if NATO members had sent tanks etc. earlier the Ukrainians would have been much better tooled up - which is true in strictly military terms, but let's not forget the diplomatic climate at the time.  Better for the Ukrainians to have gotten their kit later rather than not at all.