Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 17, 2024, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on January 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 17 that Russia does not have enough reserves to conduct large-scale offensive operations in several directions at the same time.[1] Skibitskyi stated that it is impossible for Russian forces to conduct strategically or operationally significant offensive operations without “powerful” reserves and implied that Russia does not have such reserves.[2] Skibitskyi noted that mobilization measures are ongoing in Russia, likely referring to the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign that relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants.[3] It is unclear if Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign has provided or would be able to provide the increased number of personnel that an intensified Russian offensive effort would require. Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments, and that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to another “partial mobilization” like Russia conducted in September 2022 or a large-scale general mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[4] Skibitskyi’s statements suggest that although the Russian military is able to generate enough manpower to conduct routine operational-level rotations in Ukraine, Russian forces may not necessarily be able to generate manpower at a rate that would allow Russian forces to quickly re-establish the operational reserves necessary for simultaneous offensive efforts in several directions.[5]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims. Medvedev claimed that “the presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories” is a “constant reason for the resumption of hostilities” and that Ukraine’s very existence as an independent state is therefore “mortally dangerous” for Ukrainians.[6] Medvedev claimed that an independent Ukraine will never be a legitimate state regardless of who leads the government and that a future conflict for Ukrainian territory is inevitable whether or not it is a new conflict or the continuation of the current Russian war in Ukraine.[7] Medvedev’s January 17 statement is one of many recent signals from senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, that Putin and the Kremlin have no interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and that Putin’s maximalist war aims in Ukraine remain unchanged.[8] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia’s commitment to these maximalist objectives as unwavering by claiming that Ukrainian accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO will not prevent future conflict.[9] Medvedev notably did not define what he considers to be historical Russian territories, but Putin has defined historical Russian lands as the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[10] Medvedev’s opacity may be intentional, as the Kremlin’s loosely defined concept of “historical Russian territories” allows the Kremlin to pursue expansionist objectives wherever and whenever it so determines in a broad area including Central Asia, the Caucuses and parts of Eastern Europe.[11] Medvedev’s emphasis on the destruction of any Ukrainian state on these “historical Russian territories” could indicate that some actors in the Kremlin prioritize expansionist objectives over the identified objective of regime change under calls for the “de-nazification” of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Odesa and Kharkiv cities on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv City and 20 Shahed-136/-131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 19 of the drones over Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[12] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian drones largely targeted Odesa City.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings in Odesa and Kharkiv cities.[14]

Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on January 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Shahed drone with a hybrid air defense system — referring to the so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers — for the first time.[15] Kamyshin noted that the full development of Ukraine’s own air defenses will take years, so Ukraine is creating home-made air defense systems using Soviet components and Western missiles. ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB).[16] Kamyshin also stated that Ukraine has doubled its ammunition production for NATO-caliber artillery systems.[17] Ukraine began domestically producing 155mm shells, which are a NATO-standard used by Western-supplied guns that Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) had never produced before, no later than September 2023.[18]

Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on January 16 that Germany will provide Ukraine with military goods worth more than seven billion euros (roughly $7.62 billion) in 2024.[19] The German government announced that the aid package includes ammunition for Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance drones, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles.[20] Germany provided 5.4 billion euros ($5.89 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2023.[21] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on January 16 that he would finalize a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv during a visit to Ukraine in February 2024.[22] Macron also stated that France will send 40 SCALP long-range missiles and “several hundred” unspecified bombs to Ukraine in the coming weeks.

Western officials highlighted Ukraine’s battlefield successes at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16 and 17. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Ukraine has opened a corridor to export grain in the Black Sea, weakened the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and liberated more than half of its territory that Russian forces captured since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[23] Sullivan also highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to develop its own defense industrial base (DIB).[24] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely in the near future — in line with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia is not interested in engaging in meaningful, good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Ghanan President Nana Akufo-Addo and called on them to support Ukraine’s peace formula.[26] Zelensky also met with Polish President Andrzej Duda and discussed bilateral relations, the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU).[27]

The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia. Russian information space actors within the ultranationalist milblogger community have increasingly fixated on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in 2023 and have weaponized this rhetoric to call on Russian officials to more widely mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine, curtail migrants’ access to social and economic opportunities, and substantively change Russia’s existing migration policies.[28] Russian ultranationalists have also increasingly advocated for ethnic Russians to receive more domestic power in Russia and continue to promote hyper-nationalist ideologies that are generating domestic tensions between ethnic minority communities and ethnic Russians.[29] s may malign the nominal rights to autonomy that many non-ethnic Russian communities have through their respective federal Russian republics and are likely to react harshly to discussions centering on the political, economic, and social concerns of non-ethnic Russians.[30]

The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists. Russian officials appear to have tolerated or even endorsed ultranationalists’ increasing anti-migration rhetoric since it likely generated social pressures that have augmented Russian efforts to coerce migrants into military service in Ukraine.[31] The Kremlin now appears to be struggling to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[32] Any efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists will likely only exacerbate inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning migrants. Hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia directly contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to promote the concept of a wider and ethnically inclusive “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) that encompasses non-ethnic Russians in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.[33] The Kremlin continues to rely on the ultranationalist community in its effort to solidify pro-war sentiments, hyper-nationalism, Russian orthodoxy, and “traditional” social values as core tenets of the Russian state.[34] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance these parallel efforts as Russian ultranationalists display increasing animus to non-ethnic Russians in Russia and in neighboring countries.

Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. Bashkortostan’s Baymaksky Court found prominent Bashkort activist Fail Alsynov guilty on January 11 of inciting ethnic hatred and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the court announced publicly on January 17 following a closed-door trial.[35] Alsynov allegedly gave a speech on April 28, 2023, that insulted ethnic groups from the Caucasus.[36] Hundreds of Alsynov’s supporters had gathered at the courthouse ahead of his January 17 verdict announcement, and protests involving hundreds to thousands of supporters lasted for hours following the verdict. Some Russian opposition sources reported that 2,000-5,000 people protested in support of Alsynov and that responding Russian authorities detained anywhere from five to several dozen protestors.[37] The reported scale of the Baymak protest appears comparable to if not larger than that of the antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[38] Footage shows Russian riot police using tear gas and stun grenades to dispel the protestors, two of whom Russian police beat with batons and 20-40 of whom sought medical attention following the protests.[39] Russian law enforcement reportedly detained around 20-40 protestors, and Alsynov’s supporters negotiated with Russian law enforcement to cease protests for the day in exchange for the release of the detained protestors.[40] The protests have dispersed as of this publication, though it is unclear whether activists are planning for further protests on subsequent days. Hundreds to thousands of activists gathered outside the Baymaksky Court in the days leading up to the public announcement of Alsynov’s sentence, suggesting that the size of the protests on January 17 was not necessarily spontaneous.[41]

Russian authorities appear to be better equipped to handle the Bashkortostan protests than the October 2023 Dagestan protests. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it is opening a criminal investigation into the protest for the organization of and participation in “mass riots” and for the use of violence against authorities.[42] Multiple Telegram channels that the Bashkort activists reportedly used to coordinate and spread news of the protest became temporarily unavailable on January 17, a possible Russian government censorship attempt to limit the protest from growing or spreading.[43] The Russian ultranationalist community latched onto the Bashkortostan protest in anger despite the swift government response. Some criticized Alsynov’s supporters as “extremists” and “wolves in sheep’s clothing” who only aim to separate Bashkortostan from Russia.[44] Others amplified footage of military personnel in Bashkortostan’s “Minigali Shaimuratov” Battalion disavowing the protesters and Alsynov as “traitors,” “extremists,” and “separatists.”[45] The Russian government and Bashkort military personnel’s swift response suggest that the Russian government may intensify efforts to ensure that non-ethnic Russian communities support the war in Ukraine. Russian sources’ characterization of the protesters as “separatists” organized by outside forces suggests that Russian ultranationalists will continue to label any notable unrest from non-ethnic Russians as a hybrid warfare attack against Russia.[46]

Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it opened a criminal investigation into Interregional Uzbek Community "Vatandosh" President Usman Baratov for a social media post allegedly “insulting the participants of the special military operation” after unspecified Russian military correspondents appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin.[47] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers widely criticized Baratov’s social media posts and called for Baratov to leave Russia.[48] The Investigative Committee’s swift response to milbloggers’ requests may prompt them to make future demands of the Russian government. The Investigative Committee’s prompt announcement also suggests that the Russian government is monitoring and potentially responding to demands of the Russian ultranationalist community — a subsection of the Russian information space that it routinely attempts to cultivate and co-opt to advance government narratives. Russian milbloggers also widely criticized an allegedly naturalized Russian citizen of Azeri ethnicity against whom the Investigative Committee opened a case for “attempted murder and incitement of hatred based on ethnicity” on January 17.[49] Russian milbloggers increasingly fixate on crimes that non-ethnic Russians reportedly commit, and some milbloggers have claimed that unspecified non-ethnic Russian diasporas control entire sectors of the Russian economy.[50] The Russian ultranationalist community’s framing of non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian security and economic interests are irreconcilable with the Kremlin’s portrayal of Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society. The Russian ultranationalist community may increasingly pressure the Russian government to take actions against migrant and non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities, which may exacerbate the fracture between the ultranationalist community and the government.

The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military. Moscow’s Second Western District Military Court sentenced the former head of Rosgvardia’s maritime department, Colonel Sergei Volkov, to six years in prison on January 16 for allegedly supplying low-quality radar systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and a gas pipeline from Krasnodar Krai to occupied Crimea from Ukrainian drone strikes.[51] The court found Volkov guilty of “abuse of office with grave consequences” for his participation in a 400 million ruble ($4.5 million) corruption scheme involving the acquisition of two radar systems that Volkov reportedly knew could not properly defend against Ukrainian drones.[52] The Second Western District Military Court convicted two Russian air defense officers on December 6, 2023, for negligence in failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory.[53] Russian authorities also previously detained the commander of the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army on corruption and bribery charges, likely for failing to prevent drone strikes against Moscow City in July and August 2023.[54] The Russian military command likely intends to set a precedent across the Russian military concerning possible punishment for failures to defend against Ukrainian strikes — particularly strikes against high-value targets — regardless of whether the cases explicitly allege that these officers violated Russian rules of combat duty or tangentially associate the officers’ dereliction of duties with corruption schemes.[55] The Russian command likely hopes that these precedents will improve discipline writ large among Russian forces in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed such an effect.

The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian military is forming squads of “military instructors” to deploy to African countries, likely referring to the Africa Corps, and that Russia is recruiting these squads in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly in Crimea.[56] ISW previously reported that the Africa Corps aims to subsume the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa after the Russian MoD failed to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.[57] Russian officials have routinely referred to Wagner personnel operating in Africa as “military instructors” and “advisors” since 2018 despite Wagner’s combat roles in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.[58] The GUR reported that Russia is particularly focused on recruiting Russian reservists who specialized in maintaining air defense systems, former sailors, and other specialists and that Russian reservists are attracted to this opportunity due to high salaries and the hope of avoiding fighting in Ukraine.[59] ISW has previously observed the Africa Corps advertising “high salaries” beginning at 110,000 rubles ($1,240) but stipulating that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[60] The Russian MoD announced on January 17 that Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Salifou Modi to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.[61] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.[62]

The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish–Russian financial ties. Russian outlet Kommersant stated on January 17 that Turkish banks have “universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[63] Kommersant reported that sources indicated that Turkish banks’ fear of secondary sanctions sharply increased after the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions on December 22, 2023, that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that at least two state-owned Chinese banks ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities tied to the Russian defense industry following the US’ December 2022 secondary sanctions authorization.[64]

The Russian government likely continues efforts to gain access to data on Russian citizens. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on January 17 that a Moscow court fined Amazon Cloud Services more than 200 million rubles (about $2,256,400) for not having a representative office in Russia.[65] Russian law stipulates that Russian authorities can fine entities that operate in Russia without opening a branch or representative office in Russia a penalty amounting to one-fifteenth to one-tenth of their total revenue for the year. Russia previously fined Google for a similar law that requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021.[66] Russia also previously fined Yandex for failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding the disclosure of users’ personal data to the Russian government.[67]

Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims.
• Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.
• Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16.
• The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
• The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists.
• Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community.
• Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals.
• The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps.
• The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish-Russian financial ties.
• Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024

Good news about Germany stepping up it's assistance to Ukraine, looks like they are clearing out their old marders.  Lots of talk about the Ukrainian defence industrial base being developed.  On the one hand one might be pessimistic about that as a sign that Ukraine and the West are planning for a long war, however it does seem to have been a key demand by Ukraine, and there is potential benefit (as well as risk) in making Ukraine an independently powerful military nation, as barring fundamental change on government type in Moscow (and Minsk), tensions in the region are likely to be a longterm feature, even if the war concludes in the next couple of years.   A powerful Ukraine, along with Poland which has a huge military, can act as the core of an effective foil in the region even if other European nations are required to take action elsewhere, in the middle east, Africa or against China.