Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Annika Ganzeveld, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 23, 2024, 6:20pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted ongoing Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and announced Russia’s intent to intensify its strike campaign to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Shoigu addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) collegium on April 23 and focused on the recently claimed Russian seizure of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[1] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized all of these settlements yet, however. Shoigu also focused on claimed Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka.[2] Russian forces have yet to make significant tactical gains near Chasiv Yar after advancing up to the eastern outskirts of the settlement in early April 2024 but have recently made significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka and marginal advances southwest of Donetsk City.[3] Shoigu is likely trying to broadly depict the various ongoing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine as equally successful despite mixed and limited tactical Russian success in these directions.[4] Russian forces will likely intensify ongoing offensive operations in the coming weeks to exploit Ukrainian materiel constraints ahead of the expected arrival of US security assistance.[5] Shoigu’s focus on Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, west of Avdiivka, and west and southwest of Donetsk City further indicates that Russian forces will likely intensify assaults in these areas, where Russian forces are currently prioritizing broader offensive operations, instead of elsewhere along the front.

Shoigu also announced that Russian forces will intensify strikes against Ukrainian logistics centers and storage facilities for Western-provided weapons.[6] Russian forces have heavily targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure during missile and drone strikes through March and April 2024, exploiting already degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in an effort to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid and cause long-term damage to Ukrainian war waging capabilities and public morale.[7] Russian forces will likely intensify drone and missile strikes in the coming weeks to maximize damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and defense industrial base capacity before the expected arrival of US security assistance begins to alleviate Ukraine’s critical shortage of air defense missiles.[8] Shoigu’s focus on striking Ukrainian logistics suggests that Russian forces may shift their target set to hit Ukrainian transportation infrastructure, logistics, and military storage facilities. Russian forces heavily targeted Ukrainian transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 19, and Russian forces may intend to replicate and expand these strikes in the coming weeks to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[9] The Russian military command may hope that a coordinated interdiction effort will constrain Ukraine’s ability to sufficiently distribute manpower and materiel to critical sectors of the front and delay the improved capabilities that the arrival of US security assistance will afford Ukrainian forces.[10]

Shoigu also discussed ongoing Russian military reforms during his April 23 MoD collegium address, cloaking ongoing expansion efforts in an information operation meant to falsely frame all Russian military activity as inherently defensive and responsive to supposed NATO aggression.[11] Shoigu claimed that Russian forces would continue efforts to improve their composition and structure “in proportion to the threat” posed by the United States and its allies — echoing a standard Kremlin information operation that frames the West as a constant aggressor and Russia as a passive victim trying to defend itself against external attacks. Shoigu went on to discuss the Russian military’s ongoing efforts to stand up the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD) and accused Sweden of increasing tensions on Russia’s northwestern and western flanks through its accession to NATO. Shoigu also reported that the 44th Army Corps (AC) has formed within the LMD (potentially naming the AC that Russian forces have been forming in the Republic of Karelia on the border with Finland, which borders the LMD’s new area of responsibility) and confirmed that Russia is expanding three unspecified motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions.[12] Kremlin officials have frequently claimed that Finland’s NATO accession forced Russia to create the LMD on Finnish borders, and Shoigu’s suggestion that routine NATO defensive exercises and responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine necessitate the sort of long-term Russian military buildup that Russia is currently undertaking are both continuations of the longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia is an innocent victim of aggressive NATO expansion.[13] Ongoing Russian military reforms and expansion are likely meant to prepare Russia for a potential future conventional confrontation with NATO, but the Russian attempt to justify the reforms as inherently passive and reactionary is an information operation that likely aims to force NATO states to self-deter from increasing their own defensive capabilities.[14]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg on April 23 to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.[15] The Iranian Embassy in Moscow announced that Ahmadian will meet with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev while at the summit.[16] Ahmadian met with Iraqi National Security Adviser, Qasem Araji, on the sidelines of the summit on April 23, where Araji emphasized the importance of expelling United States and international coalition forces from Iraq. The two also discussed the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders. Ahmadian will also meet with his Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, Russian, and South African counterparts at the summit. High-level meetings between Iranian and Russian defense officials such as Ahmadian and Patrushev help both sides align their national security and defense strategies and bolster Russia’s informational reputation as the leader of a coalition of like-minded states that counterbalance the West.

The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran. Russian State Duma Deputy and head of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch Adam Delimkhanov stated on April 22 that he met with Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian during a visit to Iran on Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s orders.[17] Delimkhanov reported that he and Ahmadian discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Middle East and the prospects of Russo-Iranian cooperation in countering national security threats to both states. Iran is pursuing its own interests in the North Caucasus, especially Muslim-majority regions, and is likely interested in strengthening bonds with Chechen officials to expand its influence in the region. Representatives of Iranian airline Mahan Air met with Chechen Prime Minister Muslim Huchiev in December 2023 to discuss the prospect of opening regular flights between Chechnya and Iran to strengthen trade, economic, and cultural ties between the two.[18]

United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the UK’s largest ever package of military assistance to Ukraine valued at 500 million pounds (around $662 million) on April 23.[19] Sunak announced on April 23 that the UK will provide over 400 vehicles, 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 60 boats, air defense equipment, and Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine. Sunak also stated that the UK will increase its military spending to 2.5 percent of its GDP by 2030, with spending gradually increasing to 87 billion pounds (about $108 billion) in the next six years.[20] Sunak stated that the increased defense spending will put the UK “on a war footing” as the UK is facing an “axis of authoritarian states with different values...like Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.”[21]

Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters. Moldovan law enforcement officers conducted over 150 searches mostly at the Chisinau airport and in some personal homes after receiving a tip that opposition politicians who were returning from the April 21 meeting of Moldovan opposition politicians in Moscow, which resulted in the creation of the pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, were smuggling money into Moldova.[22] Moldovan authorities reported that they confiscated about 62,000 rubles (about $660), 3,000 euros (about $3,200), and over $1.1 million during the searches. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Chief Viorel Cernauteau stated on April 23 that the money was meant to finance Moldovan political parties led by affiliates of US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor. Unspecified actors reportedly used “couriers” to transport the money from Russia to Moldova and promised them compensation ranging from 300 to 500 euros (about $320-520). Cernauteau noted that the “couriers” carried under 9,000 euros (about $9,600) of cash to avoid customs laws which require people to declare amounts over 10,000 euros (about $10,700). Shor reportedly paid demonstrators to protest Moldovan President Maia Sandu in 2022, and Moldovan authorities are investigating the Shor Party for bribing voters during the 2023 Gagauzia gubernatorial election.[23] Moldovan authorities have also detained members of Moldovan parliament who reportedly took bribes from Shor affiliates.[24] ISW previously assessed that the creation of the Victory electoral bloc would allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort as part of its efforts to destabilize Moldovan society, attack Moldova’s democratic government, and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).[25]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is blocking 150 virtual private network (VPN) services in Russia, another step in the Kremlin’s efforts to further censor and control the Russian information space. Rozkomnadzor Department for Control and Supervision Head Yevgeny Zeitsev announced during a speech at the Safer Internet Forum in Moscow on April 23 that Roskomnadzor is currently blocking 150 popular VPN services and that Roskomnadzor began restricting access to websites and social media posts that advertised VPNs on March 1, when a federal ban on advertising ways to bypass Roskomnadzor’s restrictions came into effect.[26] Zeitsev stated that Roskomnadzor has blocked roughly 700 sites that advertised VPNs since March 1 and 200,000 sites accused of spreading false information about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since February 2022. The Russian government has previously attempted to downplay its efforts to block VPNs, although the Kremlin appears increasingly unwilling to tolerate VPN usage that allows Russians to bypass censorship efforts amid ongoing efforts to further consolidate control over the Russian information space.[27]

Ukrainian drone strikes and recent flooding in Russia have reportedly brought weekly Russian oil refining to an 11-month low, although the decrease in refining output has so far been marginal.[28] Bloomberg reported on April 22 that as of mid-April 2024 Russia processed 5.22 million barrels of crude oil per day, 10,000 fewer barrels than the average in early April.[29] Russia has reportedly processed 1.23 million barrels of crude oil per day since January at refineries that Ukrainian forces previously struck with drones, a 280,000-barrel-per-day decrease from before Ukrainian forces started targeting Russian oil refineries in late January 2024.[30] Ukrainian drone strikes reportedly shut down 14 percent of Russia’s overall oil refining capacity as of April 2.[31] Flooding in Orenburg Oblast forced the Orsk oil refinery to go offline on April 7, but Reuters reported that the Orsk refinery resumed full operations on April 23.[32] Decreased Russian refining capacity likely forced Russia to import gasoline from Kazakhstan and Belarus in early April to address shortages and attempt to prevent domestic gasoline prices from rising, although there are no indications that constraints on Russian gasoline production are significant to international market values.[33] Russian officials have noted that a reduction in primary oil refining in 2024 will likely lead to increases in Russian crude oil exports since Russia would not be able to refine as much as it usually does.[34] Future Ukrainian drone strikes may disable and disrupt more of Russia’s refining capacity and inflict critical constraints on Russian refining that begin to substantially impact Russia’s production of distillate products. Ukrainian drone strikes have yet to significantly impact Russian refining production or the domestic Russian or international supply of crude oil and distillate products, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted ongoing Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and announced Russia’s intent to intensify its strike campaign to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
• Shoigu also discussed ongoing Russian military reforms during his April 23 MoD collegium address, cloaking ongoing expansion efforts in an information operation meant to falsely frame all Russian military activity as inherently defensive and responsive to supposed NATO aggression.
• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg on April 23 to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.
• The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran.
• United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the UK’s largest ever package of military assistance to Ukraine valued at 500 million pounds (around $662 million) on April 23.
• Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is blocking 150 virtual private network (VPN) services in Russia, another step in the Kremlin’s efforts to further censor and control the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian drone strikes and recent flooding in Russia have reportedly brought weekly Russian oil refining to an 11-month low, although the decrease in refining output has so far been marginal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Russian forces recently advanced near Donetsk City.
• Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the ineffectiveness of Russian drones on the battlefield.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024

Senate approves the US funding package, and the UK announces a massive support package including 1600 missiles of various types and 162 'armoured vehicles'.  What type these are remains to be seen.  Unless these include tanks, its interesting that both support packages seem to miss this item - perhaps its a desire to avoid arming Ukraine with more tanks than it immediately needs, or perhaps experience in the field is that main battle tanks are of limited use for the resources they consume, and increasingly vulnerable to countermeasures.