Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 11, 2023, 6:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Ongoing localized Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka likely demonstrate the ability of Russian forces to learn and apply tactical battlefield lessons in Ukraine. Russian forces launched localized attacks towards Avdiivka after intensive artillery preparation of the battlefield in the early hours of October 10, and geolocated footage from October 10 and 11 confirms that Russian troops advanced southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne and northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove and Krasnohorivka.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a grouping of up to three Russian battalions with tank and armored vehicle support intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka.[2] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andrii Kovavlev clarified that these battalions are part of three motorized rifle brigades of the Southern Military District’s 8th Combined Arms Army.[3]

Russian sources celebrated Russian advances in this area and outlined several adaptations that suggest that Russian forces are applying lessons learned from operations in southern Ukraine to other sectors of the front.[4] A Russian artillery battalion commander who is reportedly fighting in the area claimed that Russian forces are paying significant attention to counterbattery combat.[5] Another source who also claimed to be fighting in the area reported that Russian forces are using electronic warfare (EW) systems, conducting sound artillery preparation of the battlefield, and are demonstrating “clear interaction” between command headquarters, assault groups, aerial reconnaissance, and artillery elements.[6] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are not employing human wave-style “meat” assaults, and several Russian sources amplified footage of Russian armored vehicles leading a breakthrough along roadways towards Ukrainian positions, followed by infantry columns.[7]

The suggestion that Russian forces are effectively employing EW, counterbattery, artillery preparation, aerial reconnaissance, and inter/intra-unit communication is noteworthy, as Russian sources previously emphasized these tactical adaptations as the strengths of Russia’s defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine, particularly in June and July.[8] Furthermore, the majority of Russian forces currently fighting in the Avdiivka area are likely elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps, which the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army predominantly controls.[9] ISW has not observed any 8th Combined Arms Army elements not from DNR formations involved in ongoing attacks, and ISW assesses current Russian offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area are likely primarily comprised of DNR forces. DNR elements have suffered from pervasive issues with abusive command culture, poor discipline, and minimal training; all of which have been exacerbated by wider issues with the integration of the DNR’s more irregular force structure into Russia’s regular military, as ISW has previously reported.[10] Reports by Russian milbloggers that units in this area are displaying effective communication may suggest that DNR forces have somewhat eased their integration into regular Russian forces and have learned lessons from previous ineffective and failed attacks in the Avdiivka area.

These tactical-level adaptations and successes, however, are unlikely to translate into wider operational and strategic gains for Russian forces. Geolocated footage shows that Russian gains around Avdiivka are concentrated to the southwest of Avdiivka, and Russian forces have not completed an operational encirclement of the settlement and will likely struggle to do so if that is their intent. Avdiivka is also a notoriously well-fortified and defended Ukrainian stronghold, which will likely complicate Russian forces’ ability to closely approach or fully capture the settlement. Russian forces additionally already control segments of the critical N20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk highway and other routes that run near Avdiivka, so the hypothetical capture of Avdiivka will not open new routes of advance to the rest of Donetsk Oblast. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces likely intend attacks in the Avdiivka area to fix Ukrainian forces and prevent them from redeploying to other areas of the front. However, Ukrainian officials have already identified the Avdiivka push as a Russian fixing operation, and they are unlikely to unduly commit Ukrainian manpower to this axis.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces were successful east of Klishchiivka and Andriivka near Bakhmut.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff and Tavriisk Group Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions west of Robotyne.[13]

A large number of NATO member states recently announced aid packages to Ukraine against the backdrop of the 16th Ukraine Defense Group Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Belgium on October 11. Military and government officials from almost 50 countries met in Brussels, Belgium on October 11 for the beginning of the Contact Group on Defense of Ukraine, and multiple NATO states pledged aid and support to Ukraine.[14] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin notably announced a new $200 million aid package on October 11, which includes AIM-9 missiles for a surface-to-air defense system that the United States will soon deliver to Ukraine. He stated that “the United States will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”[15] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also announced a €20 million aid package on October 10 that includes 10 Leopard tanks.[16]

Russia’s Federation Council Defense and Security Committee voted to replace Senator Viktor Bondarev with Senator Vladimir Bulavin as Federation Council Defense and Security Committee Head on October 10. Russian Senator Vyacheslav Timchenko claimed on October 10 that Bondarev is resigning as part of the chairperson’s standard rotation and will remain the first deputy chairman of the Defense and Security Committee.[17] Timchenko claimed that he expects the Federation Council to approve Bulavin’s new appointment.[18] Russian insider sources noted Bondarev‘s ties to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), as he previously served as Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and speculated that his replacement indicates that the Russian MoD is losing influence in the “most important committee.”[19] The insider sources noted Bulavin’s previous positions in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and claimed that he has ties to both Russian Security Council Secretary and former FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev and First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko.[20] If the Russian insider sources’ claims are true, Bondarev’s replacement with Bulavin could suggest that the FSB has increased its influence over the Federation Council Defense and Security Committee compared to the Russian MoD.

Russian military command continues to celebrate the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) for its service in Ukraine, despite claims that the brigade was defeated and reportedly transferred to the Kherson direction. Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Ildar Akhmerov presented awards to servicemen of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade on October 11 for repelling Ukrainian attacks in an unspecified sector of the front a week after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu partially attributed the successful Russian defensive operations around Robotyne to the brigade.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 22 that Ukrainian forces “completely defeated“ the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and that Russian command withdrew the brigade from western Zaporizhia Oblast.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 5 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were transferred to the Kherson direction, indicating that the brigade may have been reconstituted or is in the process of reconstituting.[23] ISW has not observed the broader Russian information space discuss the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s combat operations since early to mid-September.[24] The Russian MoD is likely interested in amplifying reports of well-known units to create the image of Russian success in the information space.

Armenia continues to ostensibly distance itself from Russia after a decades-long security relationship. Armenian forces are not participating in the week-long Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “Indestructible Brotherhood-2023” exercises in Kyrgyzstan that started on October 6.[25] The Kyrgyz Presidential administration reported on October 10 that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov that he is unable to attend the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on October 13.[26] Pashinyan also stated on October 11 that Russian peacekeepers should return to Russia instead of Russian bases in Armenia if they leave Nagorno-Karabakh.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ongoing localized Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka likely demonstrate the ability of Russian forces ability to learn and apply tactical battlefield lessons in Ukraine. These tactical-level adaptations and successes, however, are unlikely to necessarily translate into wider operational and strategic gains for Russian forces.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 11.
• A large number of NATO member states recently announced aid packages to Ukraine against the backdrop of the 16th Ukraine Defense Group Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Belgium on October 11.
• Russia’s Federation Council Defense and Security Committee voted to replace Senator Viktor Bondarev with Senator Vladimir Bulavin as Federation Council Defense and Security Committee Head on October 10.
• Russian military command continues to celebrate the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) for its service in Ukraine, despite claims that the brigade was defeated and reportedly transferred to the Kherson direction.
• Armenia continues to ostensibly distance itself from Russia after a decades-long security relationship.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 11.
• Russian opposition outlet Sever Realii reported on October 11 that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) representatives may have recruited over 1,000 convicts to serve in the Russian MoD-affiliated Redut private military company (PMC).
• Russian occupation authorities are suffering staff shortages at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaig…

The above paints a more cautious picture of developments around Avdiivka, but is still fairly consistent with Deltabravo's comments yesterday in that no actual breakthrough is reported, especially to the north of the town where a Russian victory would hand them the high ground dominating the remaining supply route to the defenders.  Fighting continues to the south however, and this attack seems to be only one part of a general escalation of fighting by the Russians - Militaryland.net is reporting local attacks all along the line.  With an apparent slowdown in the fighting in the Robotyne salient over the last week, perhaps the Russians have interpreted that as preparations for a major Ukrainian effort, and are trying to disrupt this by diverting attention and resources elsewhere.