let me clarify, by "right" i mean its a decision supports liberal values.
Only in a scenario where the claimant was at a legitimate disadvantage (i.e. the baker had a monopoly position) and the defendant were likely to profit/gain (they weren't as they stand to lose business) would the decision be wrong.
The reasoning seems to be that it would be discrimination if they refused to serve him, but not for refusing to bake a cake with a particular message with which they disagreed (and which falls under a protected characteristic under the Equality Act). That’s the bit I don’t get.
Imagine the scenario that the supplier of services is a male sex worker. The service they provide is sexual services. Assuming that the sex worker is straight, could that person be obliged to provide sexual services to other men?
Presumably the “service” we would be talking about are straight male sexual services. If the complainant in this case had asked a garage to bake him a cake they’d have been well within their rights to refuse, as cake baking is not a service they offer.
And in that scenario the garage has forgone a potentially money making opportunity because they choose to discriminate in the types of services they offer (i.e. they'll refuse to bake a cake for anyone, because thats not a service they provide).
What about a jewish cake baker being asked to bake a cake with a swastika? Its not a service they provide, irrespective of the person asking for it and their protected characteristic.
What about a Halal butcher being asked to make pork sausages?
What about womens dress-maker being asked to make a pair of mens trousers?
it doesn't matter who is asking for what, if the supplier is agnostic to the characteristics of the customer (protected or otherwise) then they should be free to discriminate on the types of service they provide
I don’t think any of those analogies are right but the closest is the last one.
Being a nazi is not a protected characteristic or a status that is legally capable of being discriminated against, so there should be no issue refusing it
So to someone who likes beef isn’t, by that characteristic alone, vulnerable to discrimination
And the dressmaker self evidently doesn’t do men’s clothing, however is she refused to provide a dress for a trans man then I think that would be discriminatory
And the dressmaker self evidently doesn’t do men’s clothing, however is she refused to provide a dress for a trans man then I think that would be discriminatory [/i]
refusing to make a dress for a trans man isn't quite analgous. The bakery in this case is not refusing to make the cake on the grounds that the customer is gay, but on the grounds that they would not make that cake for anyone. The dress maker could refuse to make a dress for the trans-man if the trans-man wanted embroidery on the dress to state "some women have penises", because if the dress-maker did not like/agree with the statement the embroidery was making then they would refuse to make such a dress for anyone
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It's the right decision
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Are cakes not allowed to be gay now then? Good luck with telling that to a Victoria Sponge.
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tbh I’m not sure I have an opinion on the “right” decision other than how they arrive at it legally.
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let me clarify, by "right" i mean its a decision supports liberal values.
Only in a scenario where the claimant was at a legitimate disadvantage (i.e. the baker had a monopoly position) and the defendant were likely to profit/gain (they weren't as they stand to lose business) would the decision be wrong.
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whether this is how they arrived at the decision i make no comment
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The reasoning seems to be that it would be discrimination if they refused to serve him, but not for refusing to bake a cake with a particular message with which they disagreed (and which falls under a protected characteristic under the Equality Act). That’s the bit I don’t get.
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Imagine the scenario that the supplier of services is a male sex worker. The service they provide is sexual services. Assuming that the sex worker is straight, could that person be obliged to provide sexual services to other men?
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You don’t have to be gay to suffer from homophobic discrimination (again under the Equality Act) so I don’t see how that’s relevant.
Given it is Supreme Court sitting with five judges I’m sure they are right in law, but I don’t see it yet.
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Presumably the “service” we would be talking about are straight male sexual services. If the complainant in this case had asked a garage to bake him a cake they’d have been well within their rights to refuse, as cake baking is not a service they offer.
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The more interesting question would be what if the male prossie was racist and refused to service a black woman.
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And in that scenario the garage has forgone a potentially money making opportunity because they choose to discriminate in the types of services they offer (i.e. they'll refuse to bake a cake for anyone, because thats not a service they provide).
What about a jewish cake baker being asked to bake a cake with a swastika? Its not a service they provide, irrespective of the person asking for it and their protected characteristic.
What about a Halal butcher being asked to make pork sausages?
What about womens dress-maker being asked to make a pair of mens trousers?
it doesn't matter who is asking for what, if the supplier is agnostic to the characteristics of the customer (protected or otherwise) then they should be free to discriminate on the types of service they provide
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I don’t think any of those analogies are right but the closest is the last one.
Being a nazi is not a protected characteristic or a status that is legally capable of being discriminated against, so there should be no issue refusing it
So to someone who likes beef isn’t, by that characteristic alone, vulnerable to discrimination
And the dressmaker self evidently doesn’t do men’s clothing, however is she refused to provide a dress for a trans man then I think that would be discriminatory
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i thought it was an elegant and sensible solution to the problem.
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i wonder if you could re-do the B&B cases?
it's not that we don't want two gay men staying in a room together it's just that we don't want two men staying together.
that'd wind everybody up.
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A clear no rutting policy, applicable to both men and women , is the obvious answer
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This is summary of case:
https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2018/49.image.pdf
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And decision itself:
https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2018/49.html
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" The District Judge did not find that the bakery refused to fulfil the order because of Mr Lee’s actual or perceived sexual orientation. She found that they “cancelled this order because they oppose same sex marriage for the reason that they regard it as sinful and contrary to their genuinely held religious beliefs” (para 43). As the Court of Appeal pointed out, she did not take issue with the submission that the bakery would have supplied Mr Lee with a cake without the message “support gay marriage” and that they would also have refused to supply a cake with the message requested to a hetero-sexual customer (para 11). The objection was to the message, not the messenger.
....
25. The District Judge also considered at length the question of whether the criterion used by the bakery was “indissociable” from the protected characteristic and held that support for same sex marriage was indissociable from sexual orientation (para 42). This is, however, to misunderstand the role that “indissociability” plays in direct discrimination. It comes into play when the express or overt criterion used as the reason for less favourable treatment is not the protected characteristic itself but some proxy for it. Thus, in the classic case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751, the criterion used for allowing free entry to the council’s swimming pool was not sex but statutory retirement age. There was, however, an exact correspondence between the criterion of statutory retirement age and sex, because the retirement age for women was 60 and the retirement age for men was 65. Hence any woman aged 60 to 64 could enter free but no man aged 60 to 64 could do so. Again, in Preddy v Bull [2013] UKSC 73; [2013] 1 WLR 3741, letting double-bedded rooms to married couples but not to civil partners was directly discriminatory because marriage was (at that time) indissociable from hetero-sexual orientation. There is no need to consider that question in this case, as the criterion was quite clear. But even if there was, there is no such identity between the criterion and sexual orientation of the customer. People of all sexual orientations, gay, straight or bi-sexual, can and do support gay marriage. Support for gay marriage is not a proxy for any particular sexual orientation.
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35. In reaching the conclusion that there was no discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in this case, I do not seek to minimise or disparage the very real problem of discrimination against gay people. Nor do I ignore the very full and careful consideration which was given to the development of the law in this area, to which Mr Allen QC drew our attention at considerable length. Everyone, as article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights put it 70 years ago is “born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Experience has shown that the providers of employment, education, accommodation, goods, facilities and services do not always treat people with equal dignity and respect, especially if they have certain personal characteristics which are now protected by the law. It is deeply humiliating, and an affront to human dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person’s race, gender, disability, sexual orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics. But that is not what happened in this case and it does the project of equal treatment no favours to seek to extend it beyond its proper scope.
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. There was no less favourable treatment on this ground because anyone else would have been treated in the same way. The objection was not to Mr Lee because he, or anyone with whom he associated, held a political opinion supporting gay marriage. The objection was to being required to promote the message on the cake. The less favourable treatment was afforded to the message not to the man. It was not as if he were being refused a job, or accommodation, or baked goods in general, because of his political opinion, as for example, was alleged to have happened in Ryder v Northern Ireland Policing Board . The evidence was that they were quite prepared to serve him in other ways. The situation is not comparable to people being refused jobs, accommodation or business simply because of their religious faith. It is more akin to a Christian printing business being required to print leaflets promoting an atheist message.
48. However, there is here a much closer association between the political opinions of the man and the message that he wishes to promote, such that it could be argued that they are “indissociable” for the purpose of direct discrimination on the ground of political opinion. This would not always be the case, because the person ordering a particular message may in fact be indifferent to it. But in this case Mr Lee was perceived as holding the opinion in question. It becomes appropriate, therefore, to consider the impact of the McArthurs’ Convention rights upon the meaning and effect of FETO.
...
there is a clear distinction between refusing to produce a cake conveying a particular message, for any customer who wants such a cake, and refusing to produce a cake for the particular customer who wants it because of that customer’s characteristics. One can debate which side of the line particular factual scenarios fall. But in our case there can be no doubt. The bakery would have refused to supply this particular cake to anyone, whatever their personal characteristics. So there was no discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. If and to the extent that there was discrimination on grounds of political opinion, no justification has been shown for the compelled speech which would be entailed for imposing civil liability for refusing to fulfil the order."
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[i]Zero Gravitas10 Oct 18 13:23
And the dressmaker self evidently doesn’t do men’s clothing, however is she refused to provide a dress for a trans man then I think that would be discriminatory [/i]
refusing to make a dress for a trans man isn't quite analgous. The bakery in this case is not refusing to make the cake on the grounds that the customer is gay, but on the grounds that they would not make that cake for anyone. The dress maker could refuse to make a dress for the trans-man if the trans-man wanted embroidery on the dress to state "some women have penises", because if the dress-maker did not like/agree with the statement the embroidery was making then they would refuse to make such a dress for anyone
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https://theulsterfry.com/local-news/peace-process-under-threat-as-gay-c…
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